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14. ABSTRACT Defense attachés are critical to execution of Regional Combatant Commander's (RCC) Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) strategies and should be reassigned from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to the RCC in order to maximize cooperation with interagency members of the Ambassador's Country Team. The current command and control structure for the Defense Attaché Office (DAO) was ideal when the office was focused on Cold War intelligence collection, but is inadequate in a modern context. This paper examines the historical role of the DAO and outlines the current command and control structure of the Defense Attaché System (DAS). It explains the strategic importance of TSC in the Long War, and outlines the need for interagency cooperation if TSC plans are to be effective in a resource-constrained environment. Finally, the paper puts forth recommendations for the reformation of the DAS in order to make defense attachés more effective in implementing the RCC's TSC.					
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**Defense Attachés and Theater Security Cooperation: Bringing Military Diplomacy
into the 21st Century.**

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**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of
the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

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Abstract

Defense Attachés and Theater Security Cooperation: Bringing Military Diplomacy into the 21st Century.

Defense attachés are critical to execution of Regional Combatant Commander's (RCC) Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) strategies and should be reassigned from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to the RCC in order to maximize cooperation with interagency members of the Ambassador's Country Team. The current command and control structure for the Defense Attaché Office (DAO) was ideal when the office was focused on Cold War intelligence collection, but is inadequate in a modern context. This paper examines the historical role of the DAO and outlines the current command and control structure of the Defense Attaché System (DAS). It explains the strategic importance of TSC in the Long War, and outlines the need for interagency cooperation if TSC plans are to be effective in a resource-constrained environment. Finally, the paper puts forth recommendations for the reformation of the DAS in order to make defense attachés more effective in implementing the RCC's TSC.

Introduction

Much ink has been spilled over the question of how to better focus all of the instruments of US national power on rogue states, failing states, and trans-national armed groups. However, little concrete progress has been made at reforming the interagency process, and there is little emphasis on the problem outside of the Department of Defense (DoD). No legislation is currently pending to force a Goldwater-Nichols type reform on the executive branch of government. Although Joint Interagency Coordinating Groups (JIACGs) have been formed at the Regional Combatant Command (RCC) level, non-DoD agencies have been unable to put forward enough qualified and deployable personnel to adequately staff them. Meanwhile, those members of the interagency community that are available and deployable are quickly snapped up by ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.¹

Yet at the same time that the lack of capability within the interagency community is becoming painfully obvious to operational commanders, RCCs have been directed to develop comprehensive Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) strategies within their area of geographical responsibility that will focus DoD assets on strengthening alliances and building the capacity of allies while deterring potential aggressors. The TSC strategy seeks to change the focus of military diplomacy from reactive crisis action planning to active shaping of the international environment. For such ambitious plans to succeed in a resource-constrained environment, DoD and DoS efforts must be synchronized and mutually supporting.

¹ Office of the Joint Staff, "COCOM JIACG Overview(U)," Powerpoint, (September 2005), <https://j7.js.smil.mil/cwpd/ia/documents/JIACG%20overview%20briefing.ppt>. (accessed 13 April 2007).

To develop and synchronize their TSC plans, RCCs rely upon input from the Defense Attaché Office (DAO), the permanent DoD representative on each Ambassador's Country Team. Members of the DAO are experts on their area of interest, speak the local language, and understand the needs of their host nation. The Defense Attaché (DATT), the senior member of the DAO, is also intimately familiar with the Ambassador or Chief of Mission's (COM) Mission Performance Plan (MPP), and can help the RCC direct his TSC plan toward projects and programs that will complement the MPP.

However, while DAOs have proved to be an invaluable resource for the RCC, the Ambassador, and the host nation, they are hampered by complex command and control relationships and competing priorities. While they work directly for the Ambassador as a member of the Country Team, they are also under the operational control (OPCON) of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The DAOs are also required to coordinate many of their actions with the RCC or with regional JTF commanders. They often find themselves answerable to the Ambassador for actions taken by DoD assets that are not under their direct command or control, such as military advisory groups or elements of a regional JTF. When DAOs become overtasked, they must go back to DIA for deconfliction of competing priorities. Efficiency reports for DATTs are written at DIA, but are endorsed by both the Ambassador and the RCC.²

Yet, despite these constraints, DAOs represent a tangible asset that can be critical to the implementation of the RCC's TSC plan. While comprehensive interagency reform remains over the horizon, Country Teams are in place right now. The DAO, if properly

² U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, *Defense Attache Manual for Administration*, Defense Intelligence Agency Manual 100-1, Vol. 1, (Washington, DC: DIA, 17 March 1997), 2-A-2, 2-A-3.

empowered and resourced, can be the coordinating agent that unifies the RCC's TSC plan with the efforts of the Ambassador's Country Team.

What is needed is a comprehensive review of the DAO command and control relationships, tasks, and manning. This study will outline the historical and current roles of the military attaché, and analyze the case for and against putting the DAO under the direct control of the RCC commander. In the end, although care must be taken to ensure that critical DAO capabilities are retained, a reformation of the DAO system that assigns the DAO to the RCC promises to improve the DAO's ability to implement the RCC's TSC plan while ensuring that all DoD assets serving in foreign embassies can speak with one voice.

The origin of the “military diplomat”

*From the beginning, the military attaché was something of a hybrid in the world of international relations. He was part diplomat, part scout, and perhaps, as Lord George Curzon suggested, not entirely welcome.*³

The first permanent US military attaches were sent abroad to embassies in London, Berlin, Paris, Vienna, and St. Petersburg in 1889. Today, military attachés or military liaisons serve in nearly all of the 180 US diplomatic missions worldwide, in organizations ranging in size from a single O5 in some of the smaller nations of central Asia and the Caucasus to large offices that may include over a dozen attachés under the direction of a general/flag officer DATT.⁴ Army, Air Force and Marine Corps personnel assigned to attaché position have traditionally been Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) who

³ Timothy C. Shea, “Transforming Military Diplomacy,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, (Issue 38, 3rd Quarter 2005): 50.

⁴ U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “DAS Key Personnel Roster,” <https://do.dia.smil.mil/offices/DASroster.asp>. (accessed 13 April 2007).

have received language training from the Defense Language Institute (DLI) and have obtained an advanced degree relative to the region they specialize in.⁵ Navy attachés have consisted of both line officers and career intelligence officers from the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). However, in 2005, the Navy began to stand up a FAO program of their own, and will soon begin assigning some of their newly-qualified FAOs to attaché positions.⁶ Military attachés have traditionally been traffickers in information—conducting both information collection on potential adversaries and information sharing with allies. As military diplomats, recognized and accredited by the host nation, military attachés have enjoyed special access to foreign military and political leaders and have been able to conduct their duties under the protection of diplomatic immunity. As explained by John Prados in *Combined Fleet Decoded*:

*Diplomatic spying is tolerated because [the] other advantages accruing from the presence of envoys are considered more important. Nations deem it so advantageous, in fact, that international custom grew to include specialized representatives called attachés, who ranked below the ambassador. Armed services acquired direct representation through military and naval attachés abroad. These diplomats in uniform were active duty officers who carried diplomatic passports, attended diplomatic receptions and functions, and made official contacts between their armies and navies and those of the host countries. Even more so than diplomats, however, military and naval attachés are sanctioned spies.*⁷

Some examples of “sanctioned spying” are outlined by Prados as he described the actions of the so-called Attachés Club in Japan prior to World War II. In the 1920s, naval attachés were able to verify Japanese compliance with the Washington Naval Treaty through visits with Japanese naval officers and through dockyard visits that were sanctioned and run by the Japanese. By the mid 1930s, however, Japan had stopped cooperating with foreign attachés, and the Attachés Club (consisting of naval attachés

⁵ Daniel Fagundes, “Army Notes,” *FAO Journal*, (Volume X, Number 1, March 2006): 30.

⁶ Greg H. Molinari, “Navy Notes,” *FAO Journal*, (Volume IX, Number 4, December 2005): 32.

⁷ John Prados, *Combined Fleet Decoded*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 16-17.

from the US, UK, France, Soviet Union, Germany, Italy and China) was forced to rely upon shared information gleaned from government pronouncements, legislative budget requests, military journals, and speeches by active and retired military officers in order to build a picture of the strength of the Japanese Navy.⁸ In addition to open-source information, members of the Attachés Club also booked hotels overlooking Japanese shipyards or booked cruises that would pass close to naval dockyards in order to take photos of ships under construction. A US air attaché, Stephen Jurika, was able to obtain critical information on the Japanese Zero fighter by playing golf near a Japanese airbase and attending an airshow outside of Tokyo where a Zero was on static display.⁹

As a result of their collective collection efforts (both overt and covert), attachés able to determine that the Japanese had exceeded the Treaty limits by 1937, even though their last sanctioned shipyard visit had been in 1934. By the time they were recalled in 1941, naval attachés had gleaned mountains of valuable information about the Japanese Navy and merchant marine and had shared that information with America's allies.¹⁰

Military attachés during the Cold War

As one of the many outgrowths of the National Security Act of 1947, the newly-established Department of Defense directed the services to create their own attaché systems with the State Department in 1949. By March, 1952, DoD had created a limited executive agent system to govern attaché operations, originally underneath the Office of Special Operations (OSO). By 1961, the DIA had superseded the OSO, and had taken overall management responsibility of all service attachés. Each service retained the

⁸ Ibid, 21.

⁹ Ibid, 38.

¹⁰ Ibid, 39.

authority to operate and maintain their individual attaché systems and represented the US separately to the host country.¹¹

Not surprisingly, this led to duplication of effort and poor information sharing between services. In December, 1964, the Defense Attache System (DAS) was established to consolidate the service attachés under a single senior Defense Attaché (DATT). In July 1965, the DAS officially came under the DIA, essentially forming the DAS as it exists today.¹²

The governing DoD policy directive that outlines the mission, management, command and control, and reporting requirements is DoD Directive C-5105.32, which is dated March 23, 1973. DODD C-5105.32, directs that the DAS be maintained as “an organizational function of the DIA,” but also specifies that the “DAS will be responsive to the requirements of the SECDEF, the Secretaries of Military Departments, the JCS, the Chiefs of Services, and the commanders of unified and specified commands.”

In the intervening years, additional responsibilities have been added to the DAO office in response to RCC requirements for a permanent, stable military presence in countries where Security Assistance Organizations (SAO) exist. SAO is a blanket term that refers to “a DoD organization, regardless of actual title, located overseas with assigned responsibilities for carrying out the security assistance management functions under Public Law 87-195, Section 515.”¹³ These groups can include a US Military Group, an Office of Defense Cooperation, a Military Liaison Office, a US Military

¹¹ U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “The Defense Attaches,” Defense Intelligence Agency History Office website, <http://www.dia.mil/history/histories/attaches.html>. (accessed 28 March 2007).

¹² Ibid.

¹³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Consolidations and Reductions of U.S. Defense Attache Offices (DAOs) and Security Assistance Organizations (SAOs)*, Department of Defense Directive 5132.12, (Washington, DC: DoD, 21 November 2003), 2.

Assistance Advisory Group, or an Office of Military Cooperation. These agencies are usually manned and controlled by the RCC. However, in countries where security assistance responsibilities are few, the DAO may be dual-hatted as the SAO.¹⁴

SAO activities usually include interaction with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), a DoD agency responsible for coordinating, in conjunction with the RCC, foreign military sales (with concurrent responsibilities for technical training and support), international military education, humanitarian assistance, and de-mining training programs. Again, the DAO may be assigned to carry out these functions, in which case they are required to receive training by DSCA and are required to report their program status to the RCC and DSCA.¹⁵

Additionally, the DAO may be designated as the US Defense Representative (USDR) for their host nation, giving them responsibility to coordinate administrative and security matters for DoD noncombatant elements. For this purpose, the DATT serves as the single point of contact for the COM with regard to DoD noncombatants, and reports directly to the RCC.¹⁶

As laid out in DIA Manual 100-1, Vol 1(U), when assigned as the SAO or USDR, “the DATTs attaché title, responsibilities and reporting channels for normal attaché operational activities and functions through the Director, DIA shall be unchanged.” Additionally, although required to report to the RCC for SAO and USDR duties, the DAO cannot be tasked for support directly by the RCC. Requests by the RCC for support from the DAO for coordination of visits, administration of DoD assets, or

¹⁴ U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, *Defense Attache Operations and Management(U)*, Defense Intelligence Agency Regulation 100-5, (Washington, DC: DIA, 28 August 2001), 10. (SECRET / NOFORN) Information extracted is unclassified.

¹⁵ Ibid, 10.

¹⁶ Ibid, 11.

information requirements may be sent directly to the DAO with information to DIA, but conflicts must be adjudicated and resolved by the DIA Director of Operations for Policy (DO-5A). In cases where the DAO is *not* responsible for SAO, two separate DoD organizations will reside within the host nation that, in theory, answer to two separate commanders.¹⁷

While the RCC commander cannot affect DAO manning, he does have the ability to increase and decrease the in-country strength of other combatant and non-combatant DoD assets within his theater through deployment of personnel to augment SAO activities and standing JTFs. The RCC usually exercises operational control (OPCON) of these assets in order to prosecute conflicts and execute his TSC strategy. However, the DAO, through its direct link to DIA, is beyond the RCC's direct control and is caught in the unenviable position of trying to please three masters (the DIA DO-5A, the RCC, and the COM) with a limited staff that was structured to meet Cold War information collection requirements that no longer exist.

The crux of the issue: Intelligence Collection vs. TSC

We must change the conditions that allow terrorists to flourish and recruit, by spreading the hope of freedom to millions who've never known it. We must help raise up the failing states and stagnant societies that provide fertile ground for the terrorists.

President George W. Bush

Speech to the UN, 14 September 2005

When the DAS was originally created and placed under the DIA, the Cold War was in full swing, and the US military was just beginning its ill-fated intervention in Vietnam. RCCs did not exist then in the context that they do now; they did not cover all

¹⁷ U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, *Defense Attache Manual for Administration*, Defense Intelligence Agency Manual 100-1, Vol. 1, (Washington, DC: DIA, 17 March 1997), 2-A-3.

areas of the world, and they had not yet been given the powers that they would gain from Goldwater-Nichols. In the strategic milieu of the mid-1960s, when US policy was focused on containment of the Soviet Union, it made perfect sense to focus the DAS on intelligence collection and to place it under the DIA. The threat at that period of time was focused on conventional warfare between state actors- states with operating governments, embassies, and a diplomatic corps. The traditional model of attaché intelligence collection as practiced by the Tokyo Attachés Club was still applicable. Tanks, planes and ships needed to be counted and assessed, and military to military contacts provided a useful back-channel to quietly pass information and messages if public diplomacy failed. It is telling that the largest attaché offices in the current system, and the only two with general officers as DATTs, are in Moscow and Beijing.¹⁸

A lot has changed since then. The fall of the Soviet Union removed the threat of imminent nuclear catastrophe and eventually rendered moot the largest target of US intelligence collection. Operation DESERT STORM greatly reduced the possibility that any non-nuclear nation state would willingly challenge the US by conventional force of arms. The loss of Soviet and US sponsorship for unstable and dysfunctional regimes led to a rash of states failures in the early 1990s, which provided fertile ground for al Qaeda and other networks of armed groups to grow and multiply. The threat now facing the US from nation states- entities that are subject to international diplomacy, military deterrence, and economic sanctions- is arguably much less than that posed to US interests from transnational groups and criminal bands that do not have a diplomatic corps, a visible military force, or even a discernable return address.

¹⁸ U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, "DAS Key Personnel Roster," <https://do.dia.smil.mil/offices/DASroster.asp>. (accessed 13 April 2007).

Fighting such an enemy will require the cooperation of nations that armed groups operate from. While some of these states actively harbor groups that oppose US interests, there are many other states for which the existence of such groups in their territory is a serious challenge to their sovereignty. These states, with weak governmental structures and shaky legitimacy, share many common interests with the US and can provide crucial assistance in the struggle against al Qaeda. Building capacity in these states that will strengthen their ability to counter armed groups within their borders is a key element in prosecuting the Long War.

In 2003, the SECDEF published his Security Cooperation Guidance which directed that RCCs develop TSC strategies focused on achieving the SECDEF's theater security cooperation goals, while also directing defense agencies (including DIA and DSCA) to align their activities in support of the RCC TSC plans. He further directed that TSC plans be integrated with interagency diplomacy efforts in order to meet US strategic goals without duplicating effort.¹⁹

In response to this guidance, RCCs have developed formal processes for creating their TSC plans. In EUCOM, for example, this consists of an annual conference that is run by the TSC Branch of the J5 and which includes military representatives from each of the 92 countries within the command. These representatives are a member of either the DAO or SAO office of the represented country. During the conference, attendees review DoD and the EUCOM Commander's TSC priorities, then develop regional strategies and country campaign plans that support them. The conferences are also attended by

¹⁹ Donald Rumsfeld, *Security Cooperation Guidance (U)*, Office of the Secretary of Defense Memorandum, (Washington, DC: OSD, 24 April 2003). (SECRET / NOFORN) Information extracted is unclassified.

members of OSD and the Joint Staff as well as interagency representatives from the JIACG.²⁰

The tools available to the RCC to implement his strategy include, but are not limited to: multinational training events, multinational exercises, defense and military contacts, humanitarian assistance, information operations, and multinational education. These programs are prioritized based upon treaty commitments, guidance from OSD, the RCC commander's vision, and on the information and advice of the Country Team representatives. The EUCOM strategy divides the nations within the AOR into four categories:

Supporting Partners. Nations which share US interests and have sufficient capabilities to perform their partnership roles. Effort is focused on synchronizing cooperation activities through the Country Team; no TSC resources are expended on these countries.

Priority Partners. The primary focus of TSC resources. Nations in regional coalitions capable of resolving regional issues. Intent is to work with Country Team to develop committed, capable partners.

Cooperation Countries. The secondary TSC effort. Countries where the intent is to work with Country Teams to maintain regional access while maintaining support for US policies in their regions.

Contact Countries. Countries where the intent is to maintain contact and foster relations.²¹

Within the EUCOM strategy, priority partner nations are assigned to one of EUCOM's major Component Commands for the administration of the TSC. All other nations are the primary responsibility of the Country Team, which means that it is either the responsibility of the DAO or the SAO to carry out the plan and report progress to the EUCOM staff. The importance that RCCs place on these programs is best expressed by General Jones in his foreword to the EUCOM TSC plan:

²⁰ U.S. European Command, "EUCOM Theater Security Cooperation Process Overview." Powerpoint. <https://tepmis.eucom.smil.mil/client/TheaterSecurityCooperationProcess.ppt>. (accessed 13 April 2007).

²¹ U.S. European Command, *EUCOM TSC Strategy(U)*, (August 2006), 5-7. (SECRET / REL to USA, GBR, AUS) Information extracted is unclassified.

*Security cooperation is the cornerstone of US European Command's proactive effort to engage our allies and partners in building capacity to counter terrorism, protect homelands and common interests, and help prevent other threats from emerging.*²²

Execution of the TSC is complicated because most of the funds required are allocated to the DoS and are not directly under the RCC's control. The DoS budget for FY 2007 for foreign aid of all types was over \$25 billion, of which \$4.8 billion was actually earmarked for the DSCA.²³ When compared to the \$500 million of DoD money available to DSCA for humanitarian assistance, and the approximately \$660 million allocated by DoD for worldwide security cooperation,²⁴ it becomes clear that DoD TSC strategies must be closely coordinated with DoS and USAID efforts if they are to have the impact that RCC commanders envision.

Other DoD money is available to support the RCC's TSC goals through specialized programs directed toward a specific DoD goals (ie. counterdrug funding, former Soviet Union threat reduction funds, etc), yet the RCC is tied by statute to execute these funds as directed.²⁵ And while the DoS (through USAID) has a considerable amount money to spend on foreign aid programs, the DoS doesn't have nearly the manpower, logistical capability, or the surge capacity that is available to RCCs. Clearly, there is a need for interagency cooperation at all levels in order to ensure that these assets

²² Ibid, 2.

²³ U.S. Congress, Senate, *State, foreign operations and related programs appropriations for fiscal year 2007: hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations*, (109th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2006), 7.

²⁴ See U.S. Department of Defense, *Operation and Maintenance Overview: Fiscal Year 2007 Budget Estimates*, Office of the Secretary of Defense budget summary, (Washington, D.C.: DoD, February 2006). The funds identified as being available for TSC operations are listed under the heading *Allies/NATO Defense Burdensharing* (\$600M) and *Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid* (\$63M). The numbers are intended only to give a rough idea of the scale of DoD investment relative to the DoS. A complete and accurate tabulation would have to include, for instance, portions of the spending for multi-national training exercises that directly advance TSC goals through host-nation construction or contracting within the host-nation economy.

²⁵ See Thomas P. Galvin, "Extending the Phase Zero Campaign Mindset," *Joint Force Quarterly*, (Issue 45, 2nd Quarter 2007):49-51. Galvin estimates that in FY 2005 the EUCOM commander had direct control over only 3% of the discretionary TSC spending for his theater; the rest was either controlled by the DoS or was directly earmarked by DoD for specific TSC-related programs.

and programs are tied together toward coherent TSC goals. Yet, in the absence of a DoS regional peer organization with similar powers and responsibilities to the RCC commanders, the best hope for synchronizing DoD and DoS programs in key partner states may lie in DAOs and SAOs conducting close coordination with the Ambassador and the Country Team.

Meanwhile, at the Department of State...

The greatest threats today emerge more within states than between them, and the fundamental character of regimes matter more than the international distribution of power. It is impossible to draw neat, clear lines between our security interests and our development goals, and our democratic ideals in the world today.

*Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
Testimony at the US Senate, 2006*

Relative to the DoD, the DoS enjoys the advantages of perceived international legitimacy and a corps of Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) with years of diplomatic experience. Additionally, the DoS has the ability to call upon partners in the US interagency community, the UN, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and from within the vast network of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Many nations and international agencies that would face political threats from their supporters if they dealt with the US military (especially within the Islamic world), are more willing to deal with representatives from the DoS or USAID who come wielding the instruments of US “soft power.” While the DoD brings manpower and coercive power to the table, the DoS brings access and expertise.

The make-up of an embassy Country Team tells the story. The core of the team is a group of FSOs working on diplomatic, economic, political, labor, public affairs, information, cultural affairs and regional security issues directly for the Ambassador or charge d'affairs. In addition to the DAO, the non-DoS personnel on the Country Team include: members of the Commerce Department; legal attachés from the Federal Bureau of Investigation; members of the Department of Agriculture; members of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services; a USAID mission director; and members of the intelligence community.²⁶

The DAO, as part of a team that spans the breadth of the US government's instruments of national power, is in a unique position to synchronize the RCC's TSC program with the "transformational democracy" programs of the DoS. With the proper resources and manning, the DAO can provide the RCC information on the true strength, capability and solvency of the military and police forces, as well as information on the political, cultural, and social situation on the ground – information that is required to develop the TSC strategy. However, as the key military advisor to the Ambassador, the DATT is also able to sell the RCC's TSC strategy to the Ambassador, while deconflicting the activities of DoD assets in country (which can range from a small SAO office to combatant assets from a JTF) with ongoing programs run by USAID and other members of the Country Team. The DAO is also positioned to see gaps in each program- areas where the military can provide capabilities to assist USAID, or where USAID and its associated NGOs may be able to deliver assistance in areas where military forces would not be welcome.

²⁶ U.S. Department of State, "A U.S. Embassy at Work," DoS website, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/8710.htm> (accessed 28 March 2007).

In theory, these coordinating functions are the responsibility of the RCC's JIACG. However, while the military billets within the established JIACGs are generally filled, the interagency slots are largely vacant in most theaters. A JCS report in September, 2005 found that while the JIACG at CENTCOM had 64 interagency slots filled, EUCOM had only 7 slots filled. PACOM and SOUTHCOM reported that they had no interagency JIACG representatives.²⁷ The situation is unlikely to improve in the near future as the few available interagency representatives continue to flow to CENTOM to support ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the near term, the RCCs will most likely have to continue to rely on DAOs and Country Teams to synchronize and implement the fine details of their TSC.

A parting shot from the DIA

Throughout this unclassified analysis of the DAO's roles, functions, and possible future, the elephant in the room has been the fact that many missions of the DAO are classified, and that this discussion is thus missing a crucial element. Any actions taken to reform the attaché system must take these missions into account. While the intelligence functions of the DAO are arguably less important in today's world than building partnerships through security cooperation (including TSC-sponsored partnerships with host nation intelligence agencies), that is not to say that intelligence functions are unimportant. The crux of the matter, as stated earlier, is which mission will be given greater priority. The RCC is best positioned to determine relative priorities of TSC activities and intelligence functions within his area of responsibility. As stated by

²⁷ Office of the Joint Staff, "COCOM JIACG Overview(U)," Powerpoint, (September 2005), <https://j7.js.smil.mil/cwpd/ia/documents/JIACG%20overview%20briefing.ppt>. (accessed 13 April 2007).

Colonel Timothy Shea, “intelligence and military diplomatic activity are not zero-sum competing requirements.”²⁸ A properly manned DAO will be able to do both.

Additionally, any restructuring of the DAS will have to be closely coordinated with the DoS, to whom the DAO represents both a critical asset and a potential annoyance, particularly if the DAO’s championing of the RCC’s TSC policies eclipse its role as the Ambassador’s chief military advisor. Concurrently, the DoS must convince the host nation to accredit any new members of the Country Team. While it is easy to lay out grand plans to greatly expand the number of diplomatically accredited military officers in a key nation, planners cannot forget that the host nation may be suspicious of a sudden influx of military officers clamoring for diplomatic immunity, and may refuse to accredit them.

Finally, the corps of qualified attachés takes a long time to grow. The largest pool of attachés – the Army FAO community- requires a year of language training, 1-2 years of advanced civil schooling, and a year of In Country Training (ICT) in order to qualify a FAO in their region of specialty. The good news in this regard is that the Army FAO community is growing in response to a Department of the Army initiative to create an International Military Affairs (IMA) organization within each RCCs Army Service Component Command. This initiative will result in many more FAOs being assigned in each RCCs AOR, and may eventually provide the “bench strength” to allow augmentation of the DAO in key countries of interest.²⁹

²⁸ Timothy C. Shea, “Transforming Military Diplomacy,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, (Issue 38, 3rd Quarter 2005): 51.

²⁹ Daniel Fagundes, “Army Notes,” *FAO Journal*, (Volume X, Number 1, March 2006): 30.

Recommendations

While DAOs are serving the country well, the current system is succeeding more because of the professionalism and adaptability of its members than because of the structure of the organization. Hence, when attachés are successful in providing timely, accurate information to DIA *and* in implementing the RCC commander's TSC, it is in spite of the current system, not because of it. Implementation of the following recommendations will make the system more responsive to changing national defense priorities.

1. *Assign DAOs to the RCC.* While service components should retain the responsibility to train, equip and deploy defense attachés, DAO personnel should be assigned to the RCC once they arrive in theater. RCC commanders should have a voice in the manning strength of DAOs in their AOR through establishment and periodic review of permanent billets. Operational management of DAOs will also require the establishment of the requisite command and control capability on the RCC staff. This requirement might be met by a directorate similar to the EUCOM's TSC branch within the J5.

2. *Make all SAO offices and assets OPCON to the DATT.* In keeping with the contention that TSC actions are becoming more and more critical to the overall US diplomatic effort, DoD must achieve unity of command within each host nation in order to give the DATT the ability to fully synchronize assets and implement the RCCs TSC. Clear command/support relationships must also be outlined between the DATT and JTFs or military groups located in the host nation. Once the DATT and the JTF commander

are both subordinate to the RCC, deconfliction of authority will be markedly easier than it is under the current system, which will greatly enhance TSC cooperation.

Conclusion

While TSC strategies promise to greatly enhance the US security abroad with relatively small investments, much needs to be done in order to ensure that TSC plans are both synchronized with DoS programs and focused on the areas which will provide the greatest benefit to US interests. The DAO is uniquely positioned to coordinate and administer TSC programs within their host countries, and their contributions to TSC planning and execution have already been invaluable.

However, the old assumptions that are the foundation of the current attaché system need to be challenged in the light of post-Cold War strategic realities. The DAO can become a more effective interagency coordinating tool for the RCC if command, control and reporting relationships are redefined to give the DAO the capacity to better implement TSC policies. These skilled, professional and flexible officers are perfectly positioned to support our allies abroad by helping to build capacity within their borders. Reform of the system will help them bring the system of military diplomacy out of the Cold War and into the 21st century.

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